Security

Trust model

The submitted URL and all remote metadata are untrusted. yt-dlp and FFmpeg process attacker-controlled network content and must not have host privileges or access to unrelated files and services. The current development build is not ready for public exposure.

Controls currently implemented

port bound only to 127.0.0.1
non-root, read-only container with a small /tmp tmpfs
all Linux capabilities dropped and no-new-privileges enabled
yt-dlp plugins disabled and configuration files ignored
inspection only; media download disabled
playlists and multi-video results rejected
only HTTP/HTTPS URLs on ports 80/443 accepted
URL credentials rejected
initially resolved IPv4 and IPv6 addresses must all be globally routable
raw signed media URLs omitted from API responses
remote metadata inserted into the interface as text, not HTML

Required before download jobs

maximum source duration and estimated output size
per-job timeout and cancellation
one concurrent worker job initially
bounded CPU, memory, process, and temporary-storage use
randomized job directories and server-generated filenames
no user-controlled output templates or command fragments
FFmpeg/ffprobe validation of completed artifacts
safe handling of partial files and failed merges
automatic expiry and deletion
durable job recovery after process or container restarts
logs that exclude signed URLs, cookies, and credentials

Required before Internet deployment

Cloudflare Access deny-by-default policy
Cloudflare Tunnel with Access-token validation at the origin
no directly reachable origin application port
request-rate and body-size limits
explicit production configuration validation
dependency and container-image update procedure

SSRF limitation

Initial-host validation is necessary but incomplete. Extractors may follow redirects and retrieve manifests, APIs, or media from additional hosts. DNS answers can also change between validation and connection.

Before Internet deployment, outbound traffic from the processing service must be restricted at the network layer so private, loopback, link-local, multicast, and infrastructure-metadata destinations cannot be reached. URL validation is an additional layer, not the sole SSRF defense.

Deferred features

Browser cookies and authenticated source accounts are excluded. A cookie file is effectively an account credential. Supporting one requires encrypted secret handling, isolated injection, redacted logging, rotation, and a deliberate account-compromise risk review.

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